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MARKET STRUCTURE, COMPETITION, AND PRICING IN UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE SERVICE MARKETS
Gary Madden and Scott J. Savage*
Abstract—Several national governments argue international telephone
prices are high because of asymmetric competition and inefficiencies in the
accounting arrangements that govern the telecommunications services
trade. This paper develops a model of U.S. international telephone pricing
that allows for the accounting rate system and contains market-structure
variables for both the U.S. and foreign ends of bilateral markets. Model
estimation is on 39 bilateral telephone markets from 1991 through 1994.
Parameter estimates reveal that settlement rates, market concentration,
competition at either end of the bilateral market, and ownership are
significant determinants of prices. These findings support initiatives
promoting accounting-rate reductions and increased competition.
I. Introduction
IN THE IMMEDIATE postwar period, the accounting-ratesystem provided a reasonable basis for international
telecommunications carrier pricing and settlements.1 Na-
tional monopoly carriers were primarily concerned with
maintaining uniform prices and balanced traffic flows within
bilateral telephone markets. The environment began to
change in the 1970s when several national governments
initiated reforms in the telecommunications sector. Such
reforms recognized that rapid technological change eroded
the natural monopoly arguments for mandated supply, and
that competition is more likely to lower prices and provide
greater choice (Oum and Zhang (1995)).
Whilst technological advance and market liberalization
have substantially reduced the costs of providing interna-
tional services, the extent of these cost reductions have not
been fully reflected in lower prices. Accordingly, interna-
tional telephone prices (collection rates) have diverged
between countries that pursue collection-rate reductions and
those that have not. Collection rate reductions by ‘‘low-
price’’ (competitive) countries have increased their outgoing
traffic relative to incoming traffic from ‘‘high-price’’ coun-
tries. This has occurred directly as users in low-price
countries respond to declining collection rates, and, indi-
rectly, as a result of substitution between the higher-price
incoming and lower-price outgoing traffic.2 As such, coun-
tries that are efficient in generating outgoing traffic provide
high-price countries with an increased settlement payment
(Ergas and Patterson (1991), Stanley (1991)). Such pay-
ments worsen the low-price country’s trade balance and
transfer rents to monopoly countries. These rents are deter-
mined by the difference between the settlement rate (the
originating carrier’s payment to access the foreign country’s
network) and the actual cost incurred by the foreign carrier
in terminating the call.
Since the commencement of facilities-based competition
in 1985, U.S. carriers have mostly operated in asymmetri-
cally competitive markets.3 Figure 1 shows that, during this
period, a substantial increase in the U.S. traffic deficit has
occurred, with net settlement payments from U.S. carriers
increasing by 16% per annum. The 1995 net settlement
payment of 4,937 million U.S. dollars (USD) accounted for
4.75% of the U.S. trade deficit in goods and services (IMF
(1996), FCC (1997)). Callback providers (which allow
consumers in foreign countries to ‘‘reoriginate’’ calls as if
they originated in the U.S.) have eccentuated the traffic
deficit in recent years.
This study examines collection-rate pricing on U.S.
international telephone markets. An econometric model is
estimated that allows consideration of the relationship
between collection and settlement rates, and that between
collection rates and market structure. Parameter estimates
identify the determinants of U.S. collection rates and assist
in the evaluation of potential gains from FCC (1996) and
WTO (1997) initiatives to reduce collection and settlement
rates towards the marginal cost of service provision. Such
liberalization has the potential to reduce collection rates for
incoming calls to the U.S. and reduce the growing traffic
imbalances on U.S. bilateral markets. The paper is organized
as follows. Section II develops a theoretical model of U.S.
collection-rate pricing. An econometric model and data used
for estimation are described in section III. Estimation results
are reported in section IV, whilst section V contains conclu-
sions.
II. Theoretical Model
Several studies explore the strategic interaction between
carriers in deciding on collection and settlement rates
(Hakim and Lu (1993); Cave and Donnelly (1996); Yun,
Choi, and Ahn (1997)). They find that increased competition
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1 The accounting rate is the unit of account from which international
settlement payments are made. A country’s accounting-rate share is the
settlement rate and determines the amount carriers pay to access other
country networks (Frieden (1996)).
2 Larson, Lehman, and Weisman (1990) define substitution of incoming
for outgoing calls as call reversion, whilst complementarity is termed call
reciprocity.
3 Asymmetric competition is defined as a bilateral market with a
monopoly market structure at one end and an oligopoly (or competitive)
structure at the other end.
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at one end of a bilateral market enhances collection-rate
differentials, resulting in unfavorable traffic balances to
low-price countries. Such game-theoretical model findings,
however, are usually strongly qualified due to their restric-
tive assumptions. Further, because the models are formu-
lated in an ‘‘ideal’’ world, it is often difficult to directly test
model inferences. The approach taken here is to develop a
theoretical framework that will provide enough flexibility to
allow both cogent empirical estimation and enable examina-
tion of the robustness of model results.
Consider an asymmetrically competitive market for inter-
national outgoing calls from the U.S. (supplied by n carriers)
to a foreign country (with a monopoly carrier). For nota-
tional convenience, assume that market share for U.S.
outgoing traffic is distributed evenly among the n carriers.
The quantity of U.S. carrier j’s outgoing traffic output is
denoted qOi, with total output QO 5 Sj51n qOj. Carrier j’s
profit function (pj) is
pj 5 qOj · PO(QO, QI, YO, GO)
2 COj(qOj, wOj, TechO)
2 srO · qOj 1 srI · qI 2 CIj(qI, wOj, TechO)
(1)
where PO(QO, QI, YO, GO) is the inverse demand function for
outgoing calls (Larson, Lehman, and Weisman (1990);
Hsiao, Appelbe, and Dineen (1993)),
PO is the collection rate for outgoing calls,
QI is incoming traffic,
YO is U.S. income,
GO is a vector of sociodemographic characteristics that
influence outgoing call demand,
COj(qOj, wj, T) is carrier j’s outgoing call-handling cost,
wOj is a vector of input prices for carrier j,
TechO is technology,
srO is the settlement rate paid to the foreign carrier for
terminating outgoing calls,
srI is the settlement rate received for terminating incom-
ing calls,
qI 5 QI/n, and
CIj(qI, wOj, TechO) is carrier j’s cost of handling incoming
calls.4
Carrier j’s price-output decision is represented by a
single-shot, two-stage game and is solved by backward
induction. In stage one, n 1 1 carriers (n U.S. and the foreign
monopoly) mutually determine the accounting rate (ar)
under the 50:50 uniform-settlement rate rule. In stage two,
carrier j chooses the quantity of outgoing calls to maximize
own profits, given the negotiated accounting rate and 50:50
settlement rate share 5ar; 1/26. The first-order necessary
condition for carrier j profit maximization, given 5ar; 1/26,
SkÞj
n qOk, and qI is
PO 1 qOj 1›PO›qOj 1 okÞj
n ›PO
›qOk
·
›qOk
›qOj
1
›PO
›qI
·
›qI
›qOj 2
2 MCOj(qOj, wOj, TechO) 2 sr 1 sr ·
›qI
›qO
2 MCIj(qI, wOj, TechO) ·
›qI
›qO
5 0
(2)
where MCOj(qOj, wOj, TechO) 5 ›COj/›qOj, and MCIj(qI, wOj,
TechO) 5 ›CIj/›qIj. The term in the parenthesis captures
strategic behavior and indicates how carrier j output directly
affects the collection rate, and how variations in own output
affect the collection rate through its effect on the output
decisions of the other U.S. carriers and the foreign carrier.
Assuming the costs of handling incoming and outgoing
calls are identical, equation (2) becomes5
PO 1 qOj 1›PO›qOj 1 okÞj
n ›PO
›qOk
·
›qOk
›qOj
1
›PO
›qI
·
›qI
›qOj 2
5 MCOj
s (qOj, wOj, TechO, sr)
(3)
where MCOjs 5 [(1 1 (›qI/›qOj)) · MCOj(qOj, wOj, TechO) 1
(1 2 (›qI/›qOj)) · sr] is the shadow marginal cost of carrier j.
When there is no reversion or reciprocity ((›qI/›qOj) 5 0),
MCOjs equals the cost of handling the outgoing call plus the
settlement rate. Should reversion exist ((›qI/›qOj) , 0), the
marginal cost of calling falls with the decrease in the cost of
handling an incoming call but rises due to the associated
decline in incoming-call settlement-rate revenue. When
reciprocity exists ((›qI/›qOj) . 0), the marginal cost rises
4 Equation (1) assumes competitors are obliged to accept a uniform
settlement rate (sr 5 srO 5 srI).
5 Aside from billing and marketing costs, the costs of handling outgoing
and incoming calls should be the same, because transmission costs do not
change with the direction of traffic (Alleman and Sorce (1997)).
FIGURE 1.—U.S. INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE TRAFFIC 1980–1995
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with the increase in the cost of handling an incoming call
and is offset by increased incoming-call settlement-rate
revenue.
Outside the perfectly competitive model, price-quantity-
setting conduct follows more-general supply relations that
allow nonprice-taking conduct (Bresnahan (1989)). Because
market conduct affects carrier j pricing and profitability, it is
convenient to express its supply relation (3) as
PO 2 tOj · qOj 5 MCOjs (qOj, wOj, TechO, sr) (4)
where tOj 5 [PO 2 MCOjs (qOj, wOj, TechO, sr)]/qOj is the
ratio of price-cost markup to quantity and measures the
degree of oligopolistic competition.
Borenstein (1989) and Cowling and Waterson (1976)
express competition as a function of industry characteristics.
Here, the relationship between incoming and outgoing
traffic, dqI /dqO j, implies that carrier j may consider the
conduct of foreign monopoly carrier(s), as well as the
conduct of other U.S. carriers when pricing international
services:
tOj 5 tOj(MCIO, Comp, Priv) (5)
where MCIO is an index of market concentration for
outgoing telephone traffic,
Comp is a measure of competition at both ends of a
bilateral market, and
Priv is the extent of private ownership of carriers operat-
ing at both ends of a bilateral market.
Accordingly, carrier j’s supply relation (4) is
PO 5 MCOjs (qOj, wOj, TechO, sr)
1 tOj(MCIO, Comp, Priv) · qOj
(6)
As carrier-specific data is generally not available, equation
(2) is rewritten in aggregate form, and equation (6) is
interpreted as the supply relation for the average U.S. carrier.
The parameter tO is industry average conduct, and tO 5 0
implies no market power is present. As tO moves away from
zero, average carrier conduct is less competitive (Cowling
and Waterson (1976), Porter (1983), Bresnahan (1989)).
III. Econometric Model and Data
To enable consistent estimation of equation (6), the
endogeneity of price and quantity is recognized. Accord-
ingly, a system of equations comprising outgoing and
incoming supply relations (equation (7) and (8), respec-
tively) and outgoing and incoming demand equations (equa-
tion (9) and (10), respectively) is specified.
The log-linear system, for bilateral market i at time t, is
POit 5 p1 1 p2QOit 1 p3wOt 1 p4TechOt 1 p5Di
1 p6srOit 1 p7(MCIOit · QOit)
1 p8(Compit · QOit) 1 p9(Privit · QOit)
1 eOit
(7)
PIit 5 f1 1 f2QIit 1 f3wIit 1 f4Techlit 1 f5Di
1 f6srIit 1 f7(MCIIit · QIit)
1 f8(Compit · QIit) 1 f9(Privit · QIit) 1 eIit
(8)
QOit 5 a1 1 a2POit 1 a3YOt 1 a4QIit 1 a5Tradeit
1 a6TravOit 1 a7Sizeit 1 uOit
(9)
QIit 5 b1 1 b2PIit 1 b3YIit 1 b4QOit 1 b5Tradeit
1 b6TravIit 1 b7Sizeit 1 uIit
(10)
where eO, eI, uO, and uI are additive disturbance terms.
Definitions, sample means, and standard deviations for all
variables in equation (7) through (10) are provided in ta-
ble 1.
The nonnegative derivative ›P/›Q $ 0 reveals carrier
willingness to increase supply in response to collection-rate
increases. Collection rates are not expected to increase with
labor productivity improvements, namely ›P/›w # 0. Greater
digitization suggests lower collection rates through in-
creased efficiency; however, digitization may lead to im-
proved service quality and higher collection rates. Accord-
ingly, the sign of ›P/›Tech is indeterminate.6 D is included
in the supply relations to account for the distance-based cost
components of collection rates (that is, ›P/›D $ 0). Carrier
access to international networks is a primary production
input, and ›P/›sr $ 0 should hold. The ability of carriers to
set collection rates above cost is assumed positively related
to market concentration, or ›P/›(MCI · Q) $ 0. When U.S.
and foreign carriers compete for U.S.-originating traffic,
increased rivalry at either end of the market may reduce
outgoing and/or incoming collection rates, with ›P/
›(Comp · Q) # 0.7 Greater foreign-carrier private ownership
may result in lower outgoing and/or incoming collection
rates, and ›P/›(Priv · Q) # 0.8 Finally, the assumption that
outgoing and incoming call-transmission costs are equal
implies the restrictions ›PO/›srO 1 ›QI/›QO 5 1 and
›PI/›srI 1 ›QO/›QI 5 1.
6 An anonymous referee correctly observes that the vast majority of U.S.
digital switches are in the local network. Therefore, the estimate of
›PO/›TechO may be overstated.
7 Alternatively, increased competition at the foreign end of a market may
result in a lower settlement rate, which indirectly leads to a lower
collection rate.
8 Consumer theory implies a priori signs for equation (9) and (10).
Demand-equation estimates are not provided as the focus of this study
concerns pricing and market structure variables contained in table 2.
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The system (7) through (10) is estimated on annual data
for 39 bilateral markets for the period 1991 through 1994. Of
the 39 foreign countries contained in the sample, ten are
Asian-Pacific, one is African, eighteen are European, two
are Middle Eastern, and eight are from the western hemi-
sphere.9 Real collection rates are, on average, 24% lower in
the U.S. Average U.S. outgoing telephone traffic per country
averages 220 million minutes per annum, compared to 122
million incoming minutes. The average U.S. international
traffic deficit is equivalent to 29% of two-way (&) traffic for
each bilateral market. Market structure data reveal U.S.
bilateral telephone markets are mostly asymmetrically com-
petitive. The average market share of the dominant U.S. and
foreign country carriers are 65% and 96%, respectively. On
average, four carriers compete at the U.S. end, whilst 1.32
carriers compete at the foreign end. Because the dominant
U.S. carrier is privately owned, Priv indicates a typical
foreign dominant carrier is 74% publicly owned.
IV. Estimation Results
The system (7) through (10) is estimated by 3SLS, with
appropriate corrections for single-equation, first-order auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity, and allowance for contem-
poraneous residual covariance across equations.10 The esti-
mating equations contain region-specific intercepts for Africa,
Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Country-specific
intercepts for Australia and Sweden are also included as
Australia & US and Sweden & US telephone traffic is
approximately balanced over the sample period.11 A Wald
test does not reject the restriction that outgoing and incom-
ing call-transmission costs are equal at the 5%-level
(x2 5 0.2843). Coefficient estimates and t-ratios for the
supply relations are reported in table 2.
All cost and market-structure estimated coefficients in
equation (7) are signed according to a priori expectations
and are inelastic. Of particular interest is the estimated sign
for settlement rates (srO) which is positive and supports the
Hakim and Lu (1993) conjecture. The U.S. collection-rate
elasticity with respect to the settlement rate is smaller than
the corresponding elasticity reported for the incoming
supply relation (8). The estimate implies a percent reduction
in the settlement rate reduces outgoing collection rates by
0.25%. As expected, the coefficient for distance is inelastic,
because technological change has seen the historically
determined ‘‘distance-based component’’ of pricing become
less relevant. It is not clear how to interpret the reported
positive coefficient for digitization (TechO). Digitization
measures U.S. network sophistication. An increase in digiti-
zation is expected to lower collection rates in the long run
through productivity improvements. A positive estimate
9 Asian-Pacific: Australia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, New Zealand,
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand; Africa:
Nigeria; European: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; Middle-
East: Egypt and Israel; western hemisphere: Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa
Rica, Honduras, Equador, Mexico, and Venezuela.
10 Significant Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Pagan statistics indicate the
presence of first-order autocorrelation and heteroskedastcity in all equa-
tions estimated by 2SLS. Following Acton and Vogelsang (1992), the
sample observations are weighted by the U.S. share of U.S. & foreign
country traffic to allow for heteroskedastcity.
11 The U.S. had a traffic surplus in only one of the 156 sample markets,
U.S. & Sweden in 1991. Although the U.S. was in deficit with Australia
from 1991 to 1994, the market has the most balanced distribution of
two-way traffic, with 52% of total traffic originating from the U.S.
TABLE 1.—VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 1991–1994
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev
PO real per-minute peak outgoing collection rate (USD) 1.16 0.23
PI real per-minute peak incoming collection rate (USD) 1.52 0.99
QO minutes of outgoing U.S. traffic (millions) 220 431
QI minutes of incoming traffic (millions) 122 273
wO U.S. mainlines per employee (an input cost proxy) 218 17
wI foreign country mainlines per employee 145 67
TechO U.S. network digitization (a technology proxy) (%) 62 7.55
TechI foreign country digitization (%) 58 22
D distance from Washington, D.C., to the foreign country capital city (km) 8023 3679
srO real per-minute settlement rate for outgoing traffic (USD) 0.65 0.21
srI real per-minute settlement rate for incoming traffic (USD) 0.57 0.24
MCIO dominant U.S. carrier share of outgoing traffic (%) 65 8.4
MCII foreign dominant carrier share of traffic terminating in the U.S. (%) 96 10
Comp U.S. and foreign facilities-based carriers in the bilateral market 5.32 0.81
Priv one plus the private ownership share of the dominant foreign carrier 1.26 0.38
YO U.S. real GDP (billion USD) 5922 220
YI foreign country real GDP (billion USD) 356 707
TravO foreign residents traveling to the U.S. (million) 1.14 3.06
TravI U.S. residents traveling to the foreign country (million) 1.08 3.17
Trade U.S.-foreign country real exports and imports (million USD) 23758 41721
Size product of U.S. and foreign country population (billion) 14189 36086
Source. FCC (1991–1995); TeleGeography, Inc. (1995); IMF (1996); ITU (1996a, 1996b); Bali Online (1997); World Bank (1997); World Tourism
Organization (1997).
Note; (a) As market-specific traffic data are unavailable for many foreign countries, country f dominant carrier’s share of world outgoing traffic is used to proxy
the share of outgoing traffic to the U.S.
(b) Base year 1991.
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suggests that carriers may be pricing according to improved
quality of service.
The coefficient for MCIO · QO is positive and indicates
that collection rates are higher the more concentrated is the
U.S. outgoing-call market. A percent decrease in concentra-
tion in the U.S. outgoing-call market is estimated to reduce
U.S. collection rates by 0.15%. To obtain clearer interpreta-
tion of this result, the U.S. = Hong Kong and U.S. =
Honduras markets are considered.12 The U.S. = Hong Kong
market is least concentrated (53%) and is the competitive
benchmark, whilst the U.S. = Honduras market is the most
concentrated (79%). Should the U.S. dominant carrier’s
market share fall to the benchmark level, U.S. = Honduras
collection rates would decline by approximately 5%. The
reported negative coefficient for competition (Comp · QO)
indicates that the conduct of the average U.S. carrier
responds to the number of carriers operating at the foreign
end. The more numerous are foreign carriers, the closer the
bilateral market is to being symmetrically competitive, and
the average U.S. carrier is likely to be more price competi-
tive. The estimated coefficient on (Priv · QO) implies outgo-
ing collection rates are approximately 1% lower in bilateral
markets when the foreign end is served by a fully privately
owned carrier.
The estimated incoming supply relation (8) shows all
coefficients other than incoming traffic are signed according
to a priori expectations. This negative coefficient for QI
implies the average foreign carrier’s supply relation curve is
negatively sloped. The estimated coefficient for incoming
settlement rates (srI) implies a percent reduction in the
incoming settlement rate leads to a 0.786% reduction in
collection rates for incoming calls. As is the case for
outgoing calls, incoming collection rates are positively
related to distance, and the relationship is similar in magni-
tude to that reported in the outgoing supply relation.
Market concentration (MCII · QI) has a positive impact on
incoming collection rates; namely, collection rates are
higher in more-concentrated markets. The relative size of the
estimated coefficients for MCIO · QO and MCII · QI suggests
market power is stronger at the foreign end of the bilateral
market.13 This result is not surprising as the foreign end of
U.S. bilateral telephone markets is typically operated by a
publicly -owned monopoly which can support substantially
higher incoming collection rates. The competition variable
(Comp · QI) is insignificant. Because the foreign end of the
average bilateral market is typically operated by a monopoly
carrier, a reduction in market concentration closely tracks
the commencement of competition. Hence, it is not possible
to isolate the independent impact that Comp has on incom-
ing collection rates.
V. Conclusions
The U.S. has been experiencing substantial growth in its
international telephone-traffic deficit. Several commentators
argue that the deficit is caused by lower U.S. prices (due to
market liberalization) and an inefficient accounting-rate
system. This study quantifies determinants of U.S. collection
rates, and, in doing so, provides a justification for telecom-
munications reforms suggested by the FCC and the WTO.
12 Market share data for all U.S. outgoing markets, for the period 1991
through 1994, show the U.S. = Hong Kong market has the lowest average
concentration, whilst the U.S. = Honduras market has the highest average
concentration.
13 An anonymous referee suggested the interpretation of table 2 estimates
in terms of competitive conduct implied by equation (4). Following
Sullivan (1985), reduced-form estimates of ePOsrO (the elasticity of PO with
respect to srO), eQOsrO, ePIsrI, and ePIsrI are used to calculate the equiva-lent number of carriers playing a quantity Cournot game (n*). Lower-
bound estimates of n*O 5 4.52 and n*I 5 3.17 confirm that industry average
conduct is more competitive for U.S. carriers than foreign-country carriers
(qualitatively similar estimates of n*o and n*I were obtained using the
exogenous input cost (w) variable as a proxy for marginal cost).
TABLE 2.—3SLS ESTIMATES FOR SUPPLY RELATIONS
Outgoing Call Supply Relation (7) Incoming Call Supply Relation (8)
Independent Variables Estimated Coefficient t-Ratio Independent Variables Estimated Coefficient t-Ratio
Cost Cost
QO 0.046a 3.590 QI 20.528a 23.972
wO 20.565a 26.012 wI 20.225a 23.349
TechO 0.684a 5.627 TechI 20.023 20.388
D 0.205a 10.81 D 0.192b 1.793
srO 0.249a 10.72 srI 0.786a 25.10
Market structure Market structure
MCIO · QO 0.153a 3.162 MCII · QI 0.747a 6.817
Comp · QO 20.149a 23.208 Comp · QI 20.104 21.076
Priv · QO 20.011a 23.596 Priv · QI 20.020b 21.742
Region/country Region/country
Africa 0.066 0.960 Africa 21.106a 22.902
Asia-Pacific 0.041 0.923 Asian-Pacific 20.644a 22.553
Europe 20.040 21.270 Europe 20.860a 24.873
Middle East 20.048 20.977 Middle East 20.846a 23.061
Australia 0.030 0.327 Australia 21.172a 23.520
Sweden 0.100 1.634 Sweden 0.024 0.077
Constant 1.029 1.478 Constant 2.011 1.266
Note: (a) denotes significance at the 5% level.
(b) denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Model estimates indicate that traffic volume, labor produc-
tivity, digitization, settlement rates, and market structure are
important determinants of collection rates. These findings
suggest that the average U.S. carrier may consider the
market conduct of foreign and other U.S. carriers when
pricing international services. In particular, model estimates
imply that, as bilateral markets become symmetric in
competition and private ownership, collection rates fall.
The study finds empirical support for institutional reforms
that force settlement and collection rates towards the mar-
ginal cost of service provision. Such reforms suggest several
desirable outcomes. Although international-call demand
depends on socioeconomic and demographic factors, lower
foreign-country collection rates may stimulate incoming
traffic to the U.S. and reduce the growing U.S. traffic
imbalance. A lower traffic deficit, along with settlement-rate
pricing that better reflects marginal cost, will reduce the flow
of rents from the U.S. to monopoly-provider countries. The
removal of distortions in international traffic flows and
settlement payments will provide appropriate signals for
carrier investment and promote further efficiency gains.
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